After the Russian incident, Napoleon's empire fell apart. England, Russia, Prussia, and Austria allied together to fight the French.

On June 13, 1813, Czar Alexander I, the head of the Russians, joined the Prussians and thus, the War of Liberation started. Lucky for Napoleon, he defeated the Russian and Prussian armies in Lutzen and Bautzen.

In a three-day battle at Leipzig, also known as the Battle of the Nations, the French were outnumbered in every way. The French had to retreat. Then on March 30, 1814 the allies captured Paris. Even Napoleon's generals realized it was a lost fight and gave up. Napoleon was forced to abdicate the throne on April 6, 1814.

Napoleon was exiled from France. He took a few soldiers to his new "empire" - the small island of Elba, a small island within sight of Corsica. He was allowed to keep his title of emperor and promised to pay two million francs every year to France.

THE ESCAPE and THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA

After Napoleon’s Exile, European leaders quarreled upon the division of spoils of Napoleon’s empire. The work of deciding the fate of Europe was done at the Congress of Vienna.

The congress was hosted by Austria and presided over by Prince Klemens von Metternich, the guiding genius of the conference.

Meanwhile, Napoleon has been in Elba for 10 months and in the midst of the squabbles of the quarreling Congress, he had escaped from the island set forth back to France.

On February 26, 1815 Napoleon Bonaparte, some generals and about a thousand soldiers of his personal guard boarded ship for their voyage from the island of Elba back to France. On this little island not very far from Corsica, the Emperor had stayed since his abdication. Napoleon Bonaparte considered it was time for his return. He was ready to put everything on the line in one last, big gamble.

The situation in France

The French were very displeased with the political leadership of King Louis XVIII. Although the King meant well, he proved to be incompetent. In the King's wake, the "émigrés" had returned to France: nobles and members of the clergy that had fled the country during the French revolution. Now they where back and they claimed, with a loud voice, their former privileges and the lands the owned before the revolution. The peasants who bought these lands for very low prices where of course very suspicious of a possible division of the lands amongst these "émigrés". France was mainly an agrarian nation in those days and the mistrust of the largest part of the population undermined the King's position. The mediocre attempts of the Bourbons to revive the unstable economy had no effects. The situation was far from good; the prices of food were sky-high because of a hard winter and a dry and very hot summer. The middle-class, that did so well under Napoleon's rule, was complaining about the bad economic situation and the poor and the needy had to live trough some very rough times. Another large group of malcontents was the ex-soldiers. After their demobilization in 1814, many of these men were able to continue their normal civilian lives. For a sizeable group of veterans, officers on half pay and ex-professional soldiers there was no place in the with inflation stricken society. Once they were conquering hero's bringing glory to France, now many of them were starving to death, deserted by that same France. It's only logical that they where unhappy and agitated. On the international scene, everything looked favorable also. At the Vienna congress the understanding among the Powers was far from good and none of them really liked the French Bourbon government.

Napoleon's march to Paris

On March 1, 1815, Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte sets again foot on French soil at Golfe-Juan, between Cannes and Antibes. A more appropriate place to land would have been the valley of the Rhine River. From there, the march to Paris would have been far easier and a lot faster. Bonaparte feared the royalist sentiments of the inhabitants of that region so he took the more difficult road through the Alps to Grenoble. His arrival took the French authorities by total surprise. It took four days for the news to reach Paris. The irresolution of the local authorities gave Napoleon the time to act without interference. The population, on whose reaction everything depended, reacted with calm and resignation. On March 7, 1815, the small Imperial column met the 5th Regiment of the Line, not far from Grenoble. Napoleon stepped forward and faced the muskets alone. With a remarkable mixture of exaggerations and lies and by using his charisma and personal power over soldiers, he managed to persuade the Regiment. With the cry: "Vive L'Empéreur" the 5th changed sides as one man. The gates of Grenoble opened and the Emperor received a warm welcome. On March 8, the 7th Regiment of the Line and its commander, Napoleon's future Aide de Camps: Colonel Charles Huchet, Count de la Bédoyère changed sides too. On every stop on his march to Paris, Napoleon addressed the people. He promised everybody exactly what they wanted to have being the opportunist that he was. Peasants he assured that they would not lose their lands to the émigrés, city people he seduced with promises of fiscal reforms. Everywhere he went he promised peace and prosperity. In the mean time, the Bourbons issued a warrant for his arrest. They send increasing numbers of troops to intercept him. Marshal Ney promised Louis XVIII he would bring Napoleon to Paris "in an iron cage". When he met his former master eye to eye on March 18, 1815 the attraction proved to be too great and he defected together with the 6.000 men in his command. In Paris, a practical joker had put up a message on the Place Vendôme. It read: "From Napoleon to Louis XVIII: my dear brother, it is not necessary to send me more troops, I already have enough of them!" Meanwhile, the mob became very restless. Revolutionary song's and slogans began to reappear. On March 19, 1815, Louis XVIII took the safe way out. Pressured by Napoleon's unstoppable march to Paris and the growing anti-royalist mood in Paris he ran in the middle of the night to Gent, Belgium (then still the Netherlands). Here he started a voluntary exile that would last for more than a hundred days.

The Emperor back in power

Napoleon made his great entrance at the Tuilleries palace in Paris on March 20, 1815. Was his return this easy? No of course not: Napoleon knew that war was inevitable but he did not proclaim a general mobilization as off yet. It would only be a matter of time before his former enemies would turn on him but he desperately needed to get the French public opinion behind him so he pleaded for peace. He had hoped that at least some of the Powers would accept the fact that he was once again in charge in France, but that did not happen. The representatives of the Powers met in Vienna on March 13; seven days before the Emperor reached Paris. They declared him an outlaw and an enemy of world peace. They pledged to assemble armies to take care of him for once and for all. On March 25, the Seventh Coalition was formed with the signing of a formal defense treaty between Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia. While Britain and Prussia had already troops in the field, the other nations prepared themselves. All Powers broke of their official relations with Napoleon's France. In France, Napoleon's position was a very weak one. He had to make lots of compromises to maintain himself. He nominated several members of the old nobility and even people that betrayed him in 1814 in high positions to get their much needed support. Off the about 730 députées in the chamber of representatives, only about 100 were on his side. The others watched his every move with eagle's eyes. This of course, limited his freedom of actions a lot. In large parts of France, rebellion ruled. In the department of the Vendée, an armed uprising broke out.

Preparations for war

Now that he could put the blame for the coming war on his enemies, Napoleon dropped his "angel of peace" act. He ordered a general mobilization on April 8 but hesitated to reinstall the conscription. Louis XVIII had abolished this hated system when he came in power after Napoleon's first abdication. There were big shortages on every possible kind of military equipment but with a lot of tremendous efforts, most of them were, to some extent, resolved. The biggest problem however was the shortage of soldiers. The Royal Army that Napoleon inherited after Louis XVIII fled for Gent was about 200,000 troops strong. Some 75,000 former soldiers and some 15,000 new volunteers responded to their Emperor's call to arms. Police, Customs and Navy units changed into infantry and artillery regiments. Veterans and the battalions of the National Guard "Gardes Nationaux" entered active service. With these units an auxiliary army of some 220,000 men was formed, an army that provided the garrisons for the "places fortes" (fortresses) and the camps. These and other measures supplied Napoleon with a force of some 290,000 troops. He had a prospect of some 150,000 more troops within 6 months, the militia class of 1815. These conscripts, put on extended leave when the conscription was abolished, would be recalled into active service.

The Allied plan of attack

Despite his efforts, Napoleon's position was still far from favorable. In time, the Allies could send between 800,000 and 1,200,000 soldiers in the field against him. They could freely choose their directions of attack along France's long borders. The Allied commanders were very aware of this last advantage. Starting from April 1, their troops would march on Paris from different directions and in great strength. They hoped to crush the smaller French armies with their superior numbers. Wellington and Blucher with about 110,000 Anglo-Dutch troops and some 117,000 Prussians would attack France from the Netherlands (Belgium since 1830). General Kleist von Nollensdorf would join Blucher with his 20,000 Prussians, stationed in Luxembourg. Schwarzenberg and about 210,000 Austrians would attack from the Black Forest. An army of 50,000 Austrians and 25,000 Piedmonts under the command of General Frimont threatened Lyons and the Rivièra and in Switzerland Bachmann and 37,000 Swiss were standing by. A Spanish-Portuguese army was still forming but would attack as soon as possible in the south and a Neapolitan army under Onasca would invade Southeast France. Barclay de Tolly's 150,000 Russians, which had the longest distance to travel, would stay in reserve in the central Rhine area after their arrival. This was a pretty impressive set-up on paper but the implementation of it on the field did not go as planned. Late May 1815 only the armies of Wellington and Blücher were in place. The Austrians could not reach the Rhine before early July and the Russians would reach their positions much later than planned.

Napoleon's reaction

Napoleon could adopt two strategies to counter the Allied attack. His first option was to take a defensive posture. Assuming that the Allies would not reach Paris before mid-August, he could use the extra time to recruit and train more combat troops. He would than be able to concentrate his forces around Paris and meet the advancing Allied armies with numerical superior forces. But this strategy meant that large parts of France would be lost to the enemy with very little or no resistance at all. This would look very bad to the French people and Napoleon still very much needed to get the population behind him. His second option was to attack the Allied troops in the Netherlands with the forces he already had. The disadvantage of this strategy was that he could only bring about 125,000 troops in the field against more than 200,000 Allied troops commanded by the Coalition's best generals. The possible advantages of a victory over these generals however were huge: An Allied defeat would make the Seventh Coalition shake on its foundations. The French would rally as one person behind Napoleon and this would give him the much-needed freedom of action. There was also a very real possibility of a pro-French revolt in the Netherlands once the Allied powers in those regions were defeated. This would give Napoleon an extra source of manpower: there were large numbers of seasoned veterans of the former Napoleonic armies in the Netherlands and lots of new recruits. Wellington's defeat would probably provoke the fall of the British Tory government. With a new Whig government, it would be much easier to talk about peace. A French victory in the Netherlands would secure the north-north-east border so Napoleon would be able to wheel to the right and attack, reinforced by his observation Corps, the enemy at his eastern border. Napoleon chose the offensive strategy. While he would attack in the Netherlands with the "Armée du Nord", his observation Corps would guard the French borders. The "Armée du Rhine" of General Jean Rapp (23,000 troops) was in position to stop the Austrians of Schwarzenberg once they started their advance. The 8,400 soldiers of General Lecourbe's "Armée du Jura" faced Bachmann's 37,000 Swiss. Marshal Suchet's 23,500 strong "Armée des Alpes" was ready to protect Lyons against the Austrian-Piedmonts army. Marshal Brune's "Armée du Var" (5,500) observed the Neapolitan army of Onasco. In the rebellious department of the Vendée, General Lamarque and his 10,000 troops were supposed to end the uprising or at least to keep it under control. Napoleon sent two armies in the field against the Spanish-Portuguese threat. The "Armée des Pyrinees Orientales" (7,600) de Decaen at Toulouse and the "Armée des Pyrinees Occidentales" (6,800) de Clausel at Bordeaux. The minister of war, Marshal Davout disposed of 20,000 troops to protect Paris with. Early in June 1815 the first preliminary orders were given. Soon after this, the first, very concealed, troop movements to the "Belgian" border commenced.

When Napoleon decided to attack the Allied forces in Belgium, he set his General Staff to work. Napoleon selected the Beaumont-Philippeville region on the French-Belgian border as the assembly area for his Armée du Nord (Army of the North). In early June 1815, the only large unit of this Army already stationed in this area was the I Corps of General Drouet d'Erlon. The Imperial Guard was still in Paris and the rest of the French Army was scattered over France and in the midst of a reorganization. Under the utmost secrecy troop movements to the French-Belgian border had begun. Napoleon had embarked on his last campaign.

The concentration of the Army

On June 7, very strict security measures took effect: all borders were closed, the mail was no longer delivered and no ships were allowed to leave French ports. The French started a huge misinformation campaign with its primary weapon being a flow of false rumors. One of these rumors was that the impending French attack would take place in the Lille region. Large units of the National Guard performed a series of maneuvers in this region to give credibility to this rumor. The secret troop movements that started on June 6 were not an easy enterprise. Five Army corps, the Imperial Guard and the Cavalry Reserve moved from as far away as Paris, Metz, Lille, Valenciennes, Laon and Mezières. They assembled in an area with a frontage of 30 km and all of this without the enemy noticing it. Whenever an active unit left garrison to proceed to the assembly area, a National Guard unit (Gardes Nationaux) very discreetly took its place. The concentration of the Armee du Nord was as good as finished when Napoleon arrived at his forward HQ at Beaumont on June 14. This concentration was a very fine military achievement and the French General Staff had every right to be proud of itself. Although this unnoticed concentration of troops gave the French Army a big advantage, there was still cause to worry because a number of its senior officers were not up to the task that lay ahead.

The French commanding officers

The Chief of Staff, Marshal Soult, was a very fine general officer but had no experience in this very demanding function. Although he did his best he was responsible for some of Napoleon's problems in the days to come. The Emperor's choice of his highest troop commanders was also very peculiar to say the least. When Marshal Ney joined Napoleon on June 15, he was given command of the left wing of the Army. Ney never had been very intelligent and always depended very much on his Staff. His courage on the battlefield, however was legendary. In 1815 he was no longer capable of acting as an independent commander. The Prince of the Moskova never fully recovered of the battle fatigue he had suffered during the Russian campaign. The Emperor knew this but entrusted Ney with this important command. Following Napoleon's first abdication in 1814, Ney had been given a high-ranking position in the Royal Army of Louis XVIII; thus his appointment as commander of the Army's left wing would most certainly win the support of some Royalists. Grouchy, just promoted to Marshal, was given command of the right wing of the Army. Grouchy was one of the finest cavalry generals in Europe at the moment but had little experience in commanding an infantry corps. Of course, Napoleon had little choice. Of the 26 Marshals of the Empire he had only 5 left in 1815. Amongst them were Davout and Suchet, two very fine officers. In stead of using them in the coming offensive he gave them other assignments. He sent Suchet to Lyon to protect to Piedmont border. Certainly an important task in 1815 but insubordinate to the invasion of Belgium. Suchet would have been a far better chief of staff than Soult. He left Davout, the Minister of War and Governor of Paris, in Paris because he wanted to have a strong man in the capital during his absence. Napoleon therefore had robbed himself of the services of two of the finest Marshals of 1815. With Suchet as chief of staff, Soult and Davout could have been given command of the Army 's wings, assignments for which they were eminently suited, and Grouchy could have been given command of the cavalry, the thing he did best. Napoleon probably had good reasons for his choice of commanding officers. The responsibility however for the things that went wrong during the following days lies with him and not with them as some parties implied after the defeat. These officers all performed to the best of their abilities during the campaign.

The French plan

Napoleon knew that it was impossible to achieve a total surprise, but he hoped that his forces would be able to attack and hold vital crossroads while the enemy was still concentrating his own forces. That is why speed was of the utmost importance. On June 15, at 0300, the Armée du Nord would advance in three columns. On the left flank General Reille's II Corps would start to advance in the direction of Thuin and Marchienne-au-pont. D'Erlon's I Corps would be right behind it. D'Erlon had orders to leave a cavalry brigade behind to observe the city of Mons and a division to guard the bridges at Thuin when they got there. In the center, the cavalry corps of Pajol - reinforced with Domon's cavalry - would advance from Beaumont to Charleroi at 0230. General Vandamme's III Corps would follow - under cover of Pajol's cavalry screen - with Lobau's VI Corps and the Guard right behind it. At 0530, Grouchy's cavalry would advance through fields and along small roads on Vandamme's right flank. On the Army's right flank, General Gerard's division - protected by one of Milhaud's Cuirassier divisions - would start to march on Charleroi at 0300. Gerard's orders also stated that he had to send reconnaissance detachments to Namur. Napoleon himself would join Vandamme's vanguard when the attack started. He would have the Marines and the Engineers of the Guard with him. The field trains of the Army had to follow Vandamme's Corps. The three leading corps had orders to send their own engineer units in front of their advancing corps to immediately clear all obstacles. Speed was of the essence! Napoleon ordered that the connection between the corps had to be maintained at all time and that they had to continuously send intelligence reports. If everything went according to the plan, the Army would be concentrated around Charleroi no later than the afternoon of the 15th.

The Allies

Blücher and Wellington had only made vague mutual support agreements because they were persuaded that Napoleon wouldn't dare to launch an offensive against them. Wellington's Army was dispersed over a wide area. He counted on his cavalry screen and espionage network to warn him in time of possible French movements. It would not be before the afternoon of the 15th that he would fully understand what was going on and by then it was almost too late. The Prussians under Blücher were more concentrated. Every corps was able to concentrate itself in less than 12 hours around his headquarters. General Zieten's corps was stationed along the border as a protective force but Zieten neglected to prepare the defense of the bridges over the Sambre river. His orders were to withdraw to Fleurus in case of a heavy French attack. If that would happen the other three corps would advance to Fleurus.

The Allied reaction

Blucher received the first intelligence reports on French activities only on June 14. Zieten's force had apprehended a French deserter in the night of June 12. This deserter informed them about the coming offensive but Zieten only forwarded this information to Blücher on the morning of the 14th. The number of rumors augmented and Bülow and Thielman were told to prepare their corps. At 1500, General Dörnberg - the commander of a cavalry brigade - reported that the French were concentrating between Mabeuge and Philippeville and that Napoleon was probably present. Two more French deserters were captured in the night of June 14. These two claimed that the offensive would start the next morning. Blücher was asleep when this message arrived. Gneisenau, his chief of staff didn't want to wake him up and issued a number of orders on his own responsibility. He ordered Thielman to concentrate his corps around Namur, Pirch between Namur and Sombreffe and Zieten to cover these movements by delaying the French as much as possible. Bülow who was told to move to Hannut, thought that it was only a routine movement and decided not to move before June 16.

The attack

At 0230 on June 15, the first French troops left their bivouacs. There was a very precise timetable to avoid problems but even from this point on things were already going wrong. Vandamme had not received his orders because the officer who was carrying them had had a riding accident and never delivered the orders. It was 0700 before Vandamme received orders to advance. In the meantime, Lobau's VI Corps which was behind Vandamme's III Corps, advanced on schedule which cause the two corps to become ensnarled. Napoleon ordered Gerard to cross the Sambre in Châtelet to avoid this "traffic jam" but it didn't help much. The commanding officer of Gerard's leading division, General Bourmont deserted early in the morning of the 15th. His division, very demoralized by this betrayal of their general, delayed Gerard's advance considerably. Reille's II Corps - the only one on schedule - destroyed a Prussian battalion at Thuin. However bad roads and the fierce resistance of a Prussian brigade at Marchienne-au-Pont delayed its further advance. Pajol reached Charleroi with his cavalry corps at about 0800 but couldn't take the bridges there without infantry support. His supporting infantry, the III Corps was still stuck in the "traffic jam" with VI Corps. Napoleon himself arrived there at 1100 with his Guard detachment. The Guard swiftly drove the Prussians out of Charleroi so Pajol could resume his advance to Gilly. Napoleon set up headquarters north of Charleroi and issued some orders. General Duhesme and some units of the Young Guard were to support Pajol and General Lefebvre-Desnoëttes had to lead the light cavalry of the Guard up the Brussels road. Reille, who had just captured Machienne-au-Pont was ordered to advance on Gosselies and to occupy this city.

Zieten retreats

Although he had received more than enough warning, Zieten was surprised by the French attack. He ordered a retreat to Fleures at 0430 and dispatched messengers to Blücher and Wellington. Blücher ordered Zieten to continue to observe the French and to retreat fighting to delay them. Zieten received this order a few minutes after 1100, at the exact moment that the Guard drove him out of Charleroi. He reported that he was under attack by 120,000 French but that he would try to hold Gosselies, Gilly and Fleurus. Blücher answered that Fleurus had to be held because the whole Prussian Army would be concentrating around Sombreffe . Ney, who had just arrived and reported to Napoleon received command of the left wing on the spot. He received the verbal order to advance on the Charleroi-Brussels road with I and II Corps and the light cavalry of the Guard. It is not sure if Napoleon ordered him at this point to take Quatre-Bras. Grouchy received orders to advance to Sombreffe. In the meantime, 8,000 Prussians had stopped Pajol's advance at Gilly. Napoleon ordered Vandamme to attack them with a frontal assault and Pajol and Exelmans to attack their flanks. The Emperor then left to ride north and check on Ney's advance.

Ney stands before Quatre-Bras

Gosselies felt into French hands at about 1600 when the Prussian garrison retreated to Fleurus. Ney and Lefebvre-Desnoëttes chased a small Allied unit out of Frasnes and followed it until about 2 km of Quatre-Bras. There they meet with elements of Perponcher's infantry division and some artillery. Ney, who had 2,000 cavalry with him at the time did not attack because he thought that he was facing a far superior force. He therefore waited for the rest of his troops to straggle up. At 2000, Ney decided to take the prudent approach and issued orders to go into bivouac for the night. Meanwhile, Vandamme's attack on Gilly was going on in a very slow pace and without any progress at all. Napoleon rode over to Vandamme's location. As usual, his appearance on the scene helped the situation. The Prussians pulled back and started a delaying action in the direction of Fleurus. Grouchy initiated a skillful cavalry pursuit that was stopped by Zieten's reserves. Vandamme refused to send his infantry to Grouchy's assistance because he didn't know at that time that Napoleon has issued a verbal order appointing Grouchy as commander of the French right wing. Because of Vandamme's refusal Zieten was able to hold Fleurus until 0500 on the 16th. By nightfall the French right wing also sets up bivouac for the night. At 2100 on the 15th, Napoleon rode back to his headquarters at Charleroi. Although many things went wrong during that first day, most of his troops are in bivouac in three compact columns near the initial objectives of the day.

Wellington's reaction

During all of June 14, nothing but unconfirmed messages reached the Duke of Wellington. Partly because of the lack of information coming from Blücher and partly because he was still under the assumption that the French were concentrating near Lille, Wellington concluded that they would attempt to cut his line of communication to the coast. He therefore issued his first orders. He directed his forces to concentrate west and southwest of Brussels under the cover of a cavalry screen. The corps commanded by the Prince of Orange received the order to concentrate in the Enghien, Soignis, and Nivelles region. Lord Hill's corps is ordered to concentrate in the vicinity of the river Dender and Lord Uxbridge's cavalry is ordered to Ninove. The Army Reserve, stationed in Brussels is ordered to prepare to march. Wellington had made an agreement with Blücher well before the 15th that he would concentrate to the southeast of Brussels in case of a French attack. With this concentration to the west-southwest, he actually increases the distance between his army and Blücher's; thus unwittingly assisting napoleon to defeat them in detail. Luckily for Wellington, two Dutch-Belgian generals correctly assessed the situation. At about 1400 Constant-Rebecque, the Prince of Orange's chief of staff began concentrating Orange's corps around Quatre-Bras. General Perponcher, one of Orange's division commanders decided that it would be much wiser to defend the strategically important crossroads at Quatre-Bras instead of concentrating near Nivelles as ordered by Wellington. With this act of insubordination he saved Wellington's reputation and Blücher's army because it prevented Ney from taking Quatre-Bras and marching on Blücher the next day. It was only at about 1500 on June 15, when the French offensive was already going on for more than 9 hours that Wellington received word of the attacks on the Prussians outposts. At about 1800 his Prussian liaison officer, General Muffling informed him that the attack was not a diversion and that the Prussians were concentrating near Sombreffe. With this information in mind Wellington issued new orders. Leaving a small portion of his army to protect his line of communication to Ostend, he orders the rest to concentrate around Nivelles thus shifting his disposition a little to the south. Rebecque's report that the French are threatening Quatre-Bras reaches Wellington at the Ball of the Duchess of Richmond in Brussels. At about 0100 on the 16th, the Duke ordered his officers to very discreetly join their troops and start concentrating them at Quatre-Bras.

Conclusion

In the early hours of June 15, it was already clear that some French commanders were not up to their task. Stupid mistakes were made and the lack of initiative of some of them was great. Lucky for the French none of the Allied commanders had even thought of blowing up or of heavily defending the bridges over the river Sambre. If they had, the situation would have been very different.

When the sun went under on June 15, the French were where they wanted to be that day and the Allies were getting into position. The two battles that would be fought on the next day, 16 June would be of the utmost importance for the rest of the campaign. But on the eve of June 15, 1815, that was still in the future .

Despite the delays of the previous day, Napoleon found himself in an excellent position on the morning of 16 June 1815. He faced Blucher at Ligny with a more than large enough force and Marshall Ney faced a small Allied force at Quatre-Bras with far superior numbers. Napoleon could have won the campaign that day; however, several things went wrong, as you will find out for yourself here.

The ground

The battle was fought around the crossroads of Quatre-Bras, a small hamlet with only four houses. This crossroads marked the junction between the Charleroi-Brussels Road and the Nivelles-Namur Road. To the southwest of the junction was the Bossu wood. South of the wood were the farms Petit-and Grand-Pierrepoint. South of the crossroads the ground fell away to the Gemioncourt farm, which lay next to a small stream in the valley. The ground then rose again to the south. Southeast of Quatre-Bras, on the Namur Road, was the hamlet of Paradis (also called Thyle of which it was a part). Southwest of that was the hamlet of Piraumont and further south, the Hutte wood. North of Quatre-Bras the ground dropped into a reverse slope.

The forces

On the morning of the 16th, Marshall Ney deployed several units of Reille's II Corps and the Guard Light Cavalry Division, commanded by Lefebvre-Desnoëttes. D'Erlon's I Corps would join him later. Ney was informed that Kellerman's III Reserve Cavalry Corps would be sent to replace the Guard Light Cavalry, which had received orders to join the Imperial Guard in the vicinity of Fleurus. The only Allied force at Quatre-Bras on the morning of the 16th was Perponcher's 2nd Dutch-Belgian Infantry Division, which belonged to the Prince of Orange's I Army Corps. Perponcher, a former commander under Napoleon and close to the scene of action, immediately realized the strategic importance of the crossroads at Quatre Bras and ordered his division there instead of to Nivelles, as ordered by Wellington. (See chapter two) Perponcher's presence at Quatre-Bras undoubtedly saved the day for the Allies. His decisiveness coupled with Ney's indecisiveness caused Napoleon's plan to go awry. Perponcher deployed as follows: four units to the right of Quatre-Bras, two on the Charleroi-Brussels Road at Gemioncourt to block that road, and three in reserve near the crossroads. Light troops occupied Piramont and the Pierrepoint farm. Orange hoped that the woods and the fields full of tall rye and corn would conceal the weakness of his force.

The preliminaries

At about midnight 15/16 June, Napoleon and Ney met at the Imperial headquarters at Charleroi. Following a long discussion with the Emperor, Ney rode back to his headquarters. Early in the morning of the 16th, at about 0600, Napoleon had Soult dispatch orders to Ney and Grouchy, his wing commanders. Grouchy was ordered to advance in the direction of Sombreffe and Gembloux and engage the Prussians he might find there. Later he was to send part of his force to the assistance of Ney should this be necessary. Ney was ordered to occupy the Quatre-Bras area and had to hold himself ready for an immediate advance up the Brussels road once the reserve reached him. This order arrived well before 1100 but it was not until 1400 that Ney took any action to occupy the area. It is unbelievable but it seems that he even neglected to warn II Corps (Reille) to prepare for an early morning advance. In addition, he neglected to order I Corps (d'Erlon) to move closer to II Corps after returning from his late meeting with Napoleon. Some authorities say that Reille, a veteran of the Peninsular War, advised Ney to be cautious. Reille, who knew British tactics, feared that the Allied strength would lie concealed in the woods, the cornfields and the reverse slope to the north. Other authorities say that Ney was no longer capable of such an important command and that he no longer knew what he was doing. Whatever the case, he waited for new troops to arrive until, finally, at 1400, he felt he had sufficient strength to force the crossroads. He had wasted 6 precious hours. During the entire morning, Ney had a 6 to 1 numerical advantage over Perponcher and Orange. A decisive French attack then would have made the day but it never materialized. At 1400, Napoleon instructed Soult to send a message to Ney, informing him that he (Napoleon) would attack Blucher at 1430. Ney was to vigorously attack any enemy in front of him, drive him back, then turn, and attack Blucher's right flank. However, if Napoleon should defeat the Prussians first, he would turn to attack the left flank of the enemy facing Ney. At 1515, Soult sent another message to Ney telling him that "the fate of France is in your hands" and that he was to attack the Prussians on the Brye heights and in St-Amands without any delay.

The battle

At about 1400, Bachelu's division advanced to attack the Piraumont farm and Foy advanced in the center, supported by Piré's lancers. The attack began very slowly and very cautiously because of Reille's fear of running into strong, concealed Allied forces. Before 1500, Gemioncourt and Piraumont were in French hands. In the Bossu wood and at Pierrepoint farm the Dutch-Belgians offered a stiff resistance but had to fall back under the French pressure. They managed, however, to hold the wood. Perponcher's line was about to crack under the combined attacks of three French divisions when, at about 1500, the first of much needed reinforcements, Picton's division and Merlen's Dutch-Belgian cavalry, arrived. Wellington arrived at about the same time, immediately took command and deployed Picton and Merlen on the left flank. Shortly after 1500, the French formed a line between Pierrepoint through Gemioncourt to Piraumont. A cavalry counterattack at 1530, led by the Prince of Orange, was driven back with heavy casualties. At about this time the Duke of Brunswick and his Brunswick contingent arrived to reinforce the Allies. At 1600, Ney received Napoleon's order, which had been dispatched at 1400, to vigorously attack the enemy in front and come to his assistance at Ligny. Up until this moment, Ney had not appreciated the importance of capturing the crossroads. He sent an aide to I Corps (d'Erlon) to hasten its advance and launched II Corps (Reille) again in a renewed attack. The newly arrived division of Jérôme Bonaparte was to clear the Bossu wood and the eastern outskirts. Foy would attack Quatre-Bras and Bachelu would assault up the Namur road. D'Erlon's I Corps, however, was by this time marching away from, not toward, Quatre-Bras. D'Erlon, who was proceeding northward on the Brussels Road from Gossilies, was overtaken near Frasnes by a staff officer who, according to d'Erlon, had written orders for d'Erlon to take his corps to Napoleon's assistance at Ligny. There are several versions of this meeting between I Corps and the unknown staff officer (see further down in this text): although d'Erlon insisted there was a written order from the Emperor to change his direction of march, such a document, if it existed, has never been found. Napoleon said that he knew nothing about such an order. Some authorities assume that a well-meaning staff officer who knew Napoleon's plan saw d'Erlon's unemployed corps and took it upon himself to redirect it to Ligny. Some authorities also propose that this same officer may have scribbled the "Imperial order" himself, which would explain why d'Erlon had seen a written order that the Emperor claimed had never been written. When Ney learned that his much-needed I Corps was marching away, he lost his temper. A few minutes later, Colonel Forbin-Janson, an Imperial aid, arrived with Napoleon's 1515 message. The colonel told him to attack Quatre-Bras at once. The furious Marshall took out his anger on the poor colonel, who was so shocked by this undeserved treatment that he forgot to hand over the written message. Therefore, it wasn't until later that evening, when it was too late, that Ney would receive the message that would have made things clear to him earlier in the day. Meanwhile, at about 1615 at Quatre-Bras, the French, supported by Piré's light cavalry, advanced almost to the crossroads. The British 42nd, 44th and 92nd regiments held their ground despite heavy casualties and repelled the French advance. Then Piré's lancers charged the British infantry and severely mauled the 42nd and 44th regiments before they were driven off. Jérôme Bonaparte was more successful. Many of Perponcher's men were driven out of the Bossu wood and the Brunswick contingent, sent to assist Perponcher, was routed during their advance south from Quatre-Bras. At about this moment a British brigade under Halket, a Hanoverian brigade under Kielmansegge and the Nassau contingent arrived and were immediately deployed to support the hard-pressed Allied line. With these new troops, Wellington now had a numerical advantage. Kellerman, who had arrived with only his forward brigade, received the order to charge Wellington's center to "overthrow the mass of the Allied infantry." Kellerman was astounded. A cavalry charge without infantry support against formed enemy infantry was suicide and would certainly lead to the destruction of his brigade. He asked Ney to confirm the order. Ney replied by saying "Go, but go then!" Infuriated by this insane order, Kellerman charged with his cuirassiers and against all odds succeeded. They decimated the 69th Regiment, routed the 33rd Regiment and found themselves in possession of the crossroads. However, without infantry support and being fired upon by a concealed battery at almost point-blank range and two British regiments, Kellerman had to give up his hard-won prize and return to the French lines. During the retreat, Kellerman's horse was killed and he barely escaped capture by clinging onto the bits of two cuirassier's horses. By this time, Jérôme had cleared the Bossu wood and already had skirmishers west of Quatre-Bras, but after the arrival of Cooke's British 1st Infantry Division of the Guard, which suffered heavy losses at Quatre-Bras, Wellington counterattacked. Jérôme's advance was stopped and the French were driven from the Bossu wood. The Allies re-took Gemioncourt and, before the fighting ended at 2100, drove the French all the way back to their starting positions. The battle resulted in a stalemate.

D'Erlon's I Corps

D'Erlons Corps was probably the key to victory. This corps, which could have sealed the fate of the Allies at Quatre-Bras or the Prussians at Ligny, was wasted by marching and countermarching all day between the two battles and contributing to neither. This is what supposedly happened: At 1515, Soult sent a message to Ney telling him that the fate of France was in his hands and that he was to attack the Prussians on the Brye heights and in St-Amands without delay. At about the same time that the 1515 message left Imperial headquarters, Napoleon received word that Ney had engaged an Allied force of 20,000 at Quatre-Bras and; therefore, had his own battle to fight. Realizing that Ney could not join him, Napoleon, according to some sources, scribbled a note to Ney telling him to send only d'Erlon's I Corps. Some historians assert that the aide-de-camp who delivered the note was never definitely identified but most name General Count de la Bédoyère. This Imperial aide-de-camp gave the order directly to d'Erlon's leading division as he was passing through the corps on his way to Marshal Ney. Other historians claimed that Napoleon knew nothing of this note. Their version of the incident is as follows: while riding to deliver an order from the Emperor to Ney, de la Bédoyère discovered I Corps marching toward Quatre-Bras. Knowing the Emperor's battle plan and that d'Erlon's corps was needed at Ligny, he hastily wrote the note in the Emperor's name. Since the document did not survive the action this cannot be verified. Ney was furious when he saw one of his corps marching away from the battle and sent an order for it to turn around immediately and join him. At approximately 1830, d'Erlon turned his corps around again to march back it to Quatre-Bras. However, he detached Jacquinot's cavalry and Durutte's infantry divisions to continue marching to Napoleon's assistance at Ligny. He warned them "to act with great prudence" which they did because they never arrived in time. He also failed to notify the Emperor of this detachment. D'Erlon, with the rest of his corps, finally arrived at Quatre-Bras at 2100, after the battle had ended. It had taken d'Erlon approximately two and one-half hours to cover the 3.2-km (2-mile) distance to Quatre-Bras!

Casualties

French loses were approximately 4,300 killed and wounded. Allied loses were approximately 4,800 killed and wounded, including the Duke of Brunswick, who died at the head of his troops.

Conclusion

The campaign could have ended on 16 June. If only Ney had been more active on the morning of the 16th and d'Erlons corps had made a contribution to either battle, the events of the next two days would have been very different. I Corps would have made a difference at either battlefield. At Ligny, an envelopment of the Prussians with d'Erlons Corps would probably have meant the destruction of the greatest part of the Prussian Army. Instead, a good portion of the Prussian Army engaged at Ligny escaped destruction. At Quatre-Bras, a victory and a skillful pursuit would have sent the Allies running to Brussels instead of giving them the chance to reform themselves at Mont-St-Jean.

During the French advance on 14-15 June, Blücher had ordered his army to close on Sombreffe He arrived himself at Sombreffe on the afternoon of June 15 and decided to make a stand there. Napoleon realized this on the morning of June 16 and while Marshal Ney engaged Wellington's force at Quatre-Bras, Napoleon engaged Blücher at Ligny in order to drive him away from Wellington. By nightfall the French held the field at Ligny, but a big portion of the Prussian army had escaped destruction. These troops would seal the fate of the Emperor.

The ground

The battle was fought along the line of the Ligne and grand Ry brooks on which the Prussian position was based. It was a long position stretching from Wagnelée in the west over Saint-Amand, Ligny and Sombreffe to the hamlet of Balâtre in the east.

The ground in this valley was marshy and the Ligne brook, although not very wide, was steep-banked. At Balâtre the brook was about 4 m wide. The highest point in the terrain, the Bussy mill where Blücher's observation post was located 162 m high. There were ten more hamlets along the brooks and four bridges.

The forces

Blücher had three of his army corps with a total of about 84,000 men and 224 cannons. All his forces were deployed along the Ligne brook on a forward slope, allowing the French to fire upon them which, of course, is what they did, with heavy casualties as a result. The Prussian position was a strong one. They occupied all the hamlets and the four bridges. The walled gardens, stone houses and farmhouses made a series of strongholds connected to each other by hedges, orchards and stone walls. However, the Prussian right flank was dangerously exposed and the left flank overextended. Ziethen's I Corps was deployed on the right of the Prussian line, Pirch's II Corps in the center and Thieleman's III Corps on the left flank.

Napoleon had about 68,000 men and 210 cannons of III Corps, IV Corps, I, II and IV Reserve Cavalry Corps and the Imperial Guard with him. III Corps was deployed on the left of the French line, facing Saint-Amand, and IV Corps before Ligny, while the cavalry corps observed the enemy's left flank. The Guard and IV Cavalry Corps stayed in reserve at Fleurus.

The preliminaries

During a reconnaissance at about 1100, Napoleon realized that the Prussians would make a stand at Ligny so he immediately ordered to make the necessary preparations to fight them. His plan was to envelop Blücher's right flank with Ney's troops while he would penetrate the Prussian center to trap and destroy at least one-half to two-thirds of the Prussian army. The Emperor wrote to Ney at 1400 to inform him that he would attack the Prussians at 1430 and that Ney was to attack vigorously any force before him, then turn, and attack Blücher's flank.

The battle

The initial French attack began between 1430 and 1500 on June 16. Vandamme's III Corps, supported by a division of II Corps under General Girard, attacked Saint-Amand. General Gérard attacked Ligny with two divisions of his Corps. As this attack began, Napoleon still expected Ney to arrive in the Prussian right flank. He wrote him at 1515 telling him to advance on Blücher immediately. Ney had his own battle to fight and would not come. Gérard's first frontal attack against Ligny failed. Other, better supported attacks were more successful and the French captured the eastern part of the village several times but were pushed back by the Prussians every time. The open terrain before Saint-Amand was a disadvantage for Vandamme and his divisions took heavy casualties. Here too, the village changed hands several times but eventually, by 1700, Vandamme managed to capture and hold Saint-Amand. Despite these heavy losses, the Emperor's plan was working. Blücher had to send in almost all his reserves and battalion after battalion was slaughtered by the French guns as they counterattacked Vandamme's divisions. The Prussians were becoming more and more shaken and disorganized and Napoleon saw how they were massing on their right flank. A breakthrough at Ligny would trap at least half the Prussian army so he ordered the Guard to prepare to attack.

While the preparations for this attack were made an unidentified but apparently hostile force was reported marching on the French left flank. It was 1800. The Emperor expected Ney but this couldn't be him because this force was marching on his flank, not the Prussian right flank as Ney was supposed to do. He hastily sent the Young Guard and Subervie's cavalry division to support Vandamme's corps, and aides to identify the mysterious arriving force. This gave Blücher some time to reform his line. His men were tired and his line was overstretched but with a determined counterattack he managed to push back Vandamme's wavering troops. Zieten broke into Saint-Amand and Thielman launched a cavalry charge down the Sombreffe-Fleurus road. The Young Guard and elements of the Old Guard quickly intervened and restored the situation at Saint-Amand and Grouchy's cavalry smashed the Prussian cavalry attack. At about 1830 the strange column was identified as d'Erlon's I Corps. To the Emperor's surprise and anger it began to countermarch back to the west. Realizing that he would get no more help from Ney, Napoleon decided to inflict maximum damage to the Prussians with the Guard. While a sudden thunderstorm concealed the Guard's preparations, the French artillery opened up on Ligny. At about 1900 Napoleon led his Guard in to the attack. They attacked Ligny in two columns of double companies, backed up by Milhaud's cavalry squadrons and about 60 guns while Gérard's infantry attacked between the Guard columns. The Prussian line was shattered under the impact of the assault by the Grenadiers and Chasseurs of the Guard. The line wavered, recoiled and finally broke.

A cavalry counterattack with 32 squadrons of Röder's cavalry, led by "Alte Vorwarts - Old Forwards" Blücher himself, broke on the Guard's squares and did nothing more than buy a little time for the infantry to escape. Blücher's horse was shot from under him during this attack and the old marshal (he was 72) lay trapped under his horse. The French cuirassiers, who were everywhere, rode over him at least twice without recognizing him. An adjutant from his staff finally helped him from the field at nightfall.

By nightfall, at about 2100, the French held the field and the Prussians were withdrawing in various states of disorder. The Prussian rear guard fought minor skirmishes around Brye and Sombreffe until 2400, as they tried to win as much time as possible for the rest of the army.

Because of the state of the terrain it was impossible for the French to effectively pursue the Prussians with cavalry so Napoleon contented himself with attempting to maintain contact.

Casualties

Prussians casualties were 16,000 killed and wounded, 600 captured, and 21 cannons. In addition, some 9,000 to 12,000 soldiers deserted in the next days. French casualties were 11,500 killed and wounded.

Conclusion

Although the French were victorious, their victory was not complete because a good portion of the Prussian army escaped destruction. Things would have been different if Ney, or even only d'Erlon's Corps, would have arrived on the Prussian right flank. This would probably have meant the destruction of the Prussian I and II Corps, thus about half of Blücher's army. With his forces so much reduced, Blücher would not have been able to march on Waterloo on 18 June and Napoleon would have won that battle and thus the campaign too.

Although Napoleon had missed the chance to win the campaign that day, his situation was satisfactory. The French had managed to keep the Allies from joining forces and Blücher was beaten, at least for now. Napoleon still had two fresh Corps (I and VI Corps) that he could use against Wellington so the chances for success were still very real that 16th day of June, 1815.

On the morning of June 18, 1815, Napoleon's French Army of the North faced the Duke of Wellington's Anglo-Allied forces and later also Blücher's Prussian forces in the vicinity of a small Belgian place called Mont-St-Jean. Here a last, great battle would be fought, the one that ended the Napoleonic era: the battle of Waterloo.

The ground

The Waterloo battlefield was very small in area even for the standards of those days. The opposing armies occupied two ridges separated by a gentle valley. In the center of the battlefield running from south to north was the Charleroi-Brussels road. Following the line of the Mont-St-Jean crest was the Ohain road: a narrow road running between high banks. East of the Brussels road was the Wavre road, a sunken road some 5 to 7 feet (1.5 to 2 meters) deep with thick hedges alongside making it a natural trench. See the map for more details on the ground.

Waterloo battlefield, 18 June 1815

The forces

The French

Napoleon had approximately 74,000 troops and 256 guns. The left flank of his first line was formed by the 3 divisions of Reille's II Corps covered by Piré's cavalry. Four divisions of d'Erlons I Corps formed the right flank with Jacquinot's cavalry on the extreme right flank. In the second line stood the French cavalry; Kellerman's Cuirassier and Guyot's Heavy Cavalry of the Guard behind II Corps and Milhaud's Cuirassier and the Light Cavalry of the Guard under Lefebvre-Desnoëttes behind I Corps. Behind this mass of infantry and cavalry stood Lobau's VI Corps and the cavalry divisions of Domon and Subervie in reserve. In the rear, near the hamlet of Le Caillou, stood the final reserve: the Imperial Guard.

The Allies

Wellington had about 68,000 men and 156 guns. His position was carefully examined by the Duke during a reconnaissance the year before and was a strong one. From Smohain and Papelotte on the left trough La-Haie-Sainte and Hougomont it stretched to Braine-L'Alleud on the right. Wellington had massed the bulk of his army on his right flank leaving the left flank lightly held. This clearly shows that he expected Blücher to show up to reinforce the Allied left flank. As was his usual custom the "Iron Duke" drew up most of his troops to the north of the Ohain road on the reverse slope, out of sight and protected against the fire of the French artillery. Only one brigade was fully exposed. The village of Braine-L'Alleud on the right flank was held by General Chassé's division while units of Lord Hill's II Corps occupied the rest of the Allied right flank. Five brigades of the Prince of Orange's I Corps occupied the center of the Allied line. The left flank was occupied by the Saxe-Weimar

troops under Prince Bernard of Saxe-Weimar and the cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur.

To the south of the Ohain road the Allies occupied some strong points, designed to break the momentum of the French attacks. On the right flank a contingent of Nassauers and Hanoverians occupied the Chateau de Goumont (usually called Hougoumont). In the center of the Allied line, just next to the Brussels road, the King's German Legion occupied the La-Haie-Sainte farm. A little further on the east side of the Brussels road was the sandpit, occupied by a detachment of the 95th Regiment. A little further to the east stood Bylandt's brigade. It is not determined if they stood there by error or deliberately but unlike the rest of the Allied troops they were left in full view of the French gunners. On the Allied left flank Papelotte, Frichermont and La Haie were occupied by the Saxe-Weimar troops.

The Prussians

In time Blücher would arrive on the field with three corps, being some 70,000 men.

 The approximate positions

The preliminaries

On 17 June 1815, Napoleon had two choices: to follow Blücher or to turn against Wellington. His biggest problem was the lack of information. The direction of the Prussian retreat was unclear because the roads were filled with deserters and stragglers so it was almost impossible to follow the tracks of the formed Prussian units. Napoleon knew almost nothing about the situation around Quatre-Bras since Ney didn't send any detailed reports. The Emperor ordered Ney to occupy Quatre-Bras without delay. If Ney was unable to do so he had to inform the Emperor immediately. Napoleon would then come to his aid. Information from cavalry reconnaissance gradually accumulated and Napoleon learned that Wellington was still at Quatre-Bras. A message from Ney confirmed this. Convinced that Blücher could not reorganize his army any sooner than in three days and that he had him on the run, Napoleon ordered Grouchy with an army of about 30,000 men (III and IV Corps, I and II Reserve Cavalry Corps) to pursue the Prussians. Grouchy's orders were to detect and prohibit any Prussian attempt to join Wellington and cover Napoleon's right flank. Grouchy marched a little before noon on 17 June in the direction of Gembloux. Battered by heavy rains, he did not put great speed in his march. Wellington only learned of Blüchers defeat at Ligny at about 0730 on the 17th. He immediately ordered to prepare to retreat. At 0900 a Prussian officer reported to Wellington that Blücher would concentrate around Wavre and that he wanted to know Wellington's intentions. Wellington told him that he would withdraw to Mont-St-Jean and that if he could be certain of the support of at least two Prussians corps he would do battle there, otherwise he would retreat to Brussels.

The Allied withdrawal began at about 1000. Wellington, still fearing for his right flank, posted about one fifth of his force at Hal and then forgot about it for the remainder of the next days. Ney did not hinder the Allies during their withdrawal, ignoring Napoleon's orders to occupy Quatre-Bras. When Napoleon arrived at Quatre-Bras, it became apparent that only Uxbridge's cavalry still occupied the area. Napoleon, furious by this new mischance, charged forward with all the cavalry and horse artillery he could find in order to get to Wellington's retreating infantry. The rest of the Army of the North followed at a much slower pace. Uxbridge tried to make a stand at Genappe but was soon outflanked and forced to retreat. During the entire pursuit a wild thunderstorm raged over the area, saturating the soil. Napoleon's vanguard approached Mont-St-Jean at about 1830, they saw considerable numbers of Allied troops on the plateau before them. To determine if he had Wellington's army before him or only a rear guard Napoleon sent forward some horse artillery and deployed Milhaud's cuirassier. They were received by the fire of at least sixty guns. Napoleon was convinced now and set out to make a thorough reconnaissance of the enemy position. It was still raining and would not stop before 0600 the next morning. Grouchy reached Gembloux at about 1900 and halted for the night. At 2000 he reported to Napoleon that the Prussians had split into two columns, one moving to Wavre, the other one probably to Liège. He would follow the major Prussian force to Wavre and cut it of if it attempted to join Wellington. Napoleon inspected his entire outpost at 0100 after a short nap and then returned to his headquarters at le Caillou. Here he found Grouchy's message that strengthened his misconception that the Prussians were out of action for some time to come. He was convinced that Grouchy knew his orders and would effectively keep the Prussians from joining Wellington.The water-saturated soil would make the effective use of artillery impossible, so at 0500 Napoleon set the hour of attack at 0900 in order to let the ground dry out a bit.

Meanwhile Blücher and his chief of staff, Gneisenau, planned on seizing the initiative from Napoleon. They would send their undefeated IV Corps under their best corps commander, General Bülow to St-Lambert. Bülow marched at 0400. His orders were to hold his corps under cover at St-Lambert if Wellington was not engaged at the time. If he was engaged Bülow was to attack Napoleon's right flank. Pirch's corps would follow him and Zieten and Thielmann were told to get their corps ready.

At 0900, the hour Napoleon wanted to start his attack, some of the French units were still not in place and the ground was still too soft to use the artillery. Napoleon was confident, he believed he was slightly outnumbered (he did not know that one-fifth of Wellington's army was sitting useless at Hal) but the morale of his troops was good. He figured he had a 90% chance of winning the battle and postponed the attack to 1300. That proved to be a fatal mistake since it allowed the Prussians to arrive on the battlefield in time. According to a local farmer named Decoster who was serving as a guide for Napoleon, the Emperor was impressed by the sight of the Allied troops but told him that he would cut them to pieces some time later.

At about 1000 Napoleon received a message from Grouchy which stated that the marshal was marching on Wavre and that most of the Prussians seemed to be attempting to join Wellingon by way of Brussels. Napoleon ordered the 7th Hussar Regiment to reconnoiter in the direction of Grouchy in order to establish contact.

Napoleon's plan of attack was simple because he needed a fast, complete victory. He wanted to annihilate Wellington's forces with straightforward frontal blows. At 1300 he would give overall command to Marshal Ney. Reille would launch a diversionary attack on Goumont in order to attract some Allied reserves from the center. A great battery of some 80 guns was formed in front of d'Erlons I Corps. This battery would lay down a heavy artillery bombardment on the Allied center and left to soften the defenses. D'Erlon then would attack towards Mont-St-Jean.

The battle

At about 1130 Reille's artillery reinforced with Kellerman's horse artillery opened up on Goumont. The purpose of the coming attack on Goumont was diversionary but Napoleon's brother Prince Jerôme obviously felt differently about it. He was determined to capture Goumont no matter at what cost. He led a brigade of his division in the woods surrounding the Chateau and cleared them by 1230. Jerôme then tried to charge the high walls of the Chateau and was repulsed. He then committed a second brigade. Some French under the command of Lieutenant Legros managed to break through the north gate but were wiped out. Wellington send in some reinforcements. At some time the whole of Jerôme's division and a brigade of Foy's division were committed to this hopeless battle that should only have been a diversion.

Around 1300 Ney requested permission to launch the main attack. At that time Napoleon's attention was drawn to a large body of troops massing in the St-Lambert area (direction Bois the Paris on the map). Jacquinot's hussars brought back some Prussian prisoners and an intercepted message from Bülow to Wellington revealing to Napoleon that Bülow was at St-Lambert and the other Prussian corps at Wavre. Napoleon now needed to make a quick decision since he now had the Allied army and a Prussian corps before him. The French army was deployed but not committed and could withdraw without a problem but if he did that he would find himself badly outnumbered by the combined Prussian-Allied armies later. He figured he still had a 60% chance of winning the battle so he choose the bolder course of action. He sent Lobau's VI Corps and Domon's and Subervie's cavalry to cover his right flank against the Prussians and a message to Grouchy ordering him to join him immediately. This message was already too late as you will understand later.

At Walhain, at about 1130, Grouchy heard the sound of the guns at Waterloo. General Gérard urged him to march to the sound of the guns but Grouchy refused, saying he had his orders to pursue the Prussians. Gérard then requested permission to march with only his corps to the Emperor but Grouchy refused that too. He told Gérard that it would be a bad decision to split up his forces. At about 1300 the Grand Battery opened fire. After about 30 minutes of heavy artillery fire, the French main attack started. The Allied infantry, except for Bylandt's exposed brigade had suffered practically no casualties from the bombardment since hardly a soldier was visible and the softness of the ground prevented ricochet fire.

For some unclear reason, three of the four divisions of d'Erlons corps advanced in the outdated and massive "Colonnes de bataillons par division" instead of the more appropriate "Colonnes de Division par Bataillon." This formation meant that each division advanced on a deployed battalion frontage with about 200 men in the front rank and about 24 to 27 ranks deep making a formidable target for the Allied troops. Only one French divisional commander, General Durutte had the good sense to use the right formation. As you will read later, his division had the greatest degree of success. As if this tactical blunder was not enough, only one cavalry brigade under Travers was sent to accompany the Infantry. Yet it was the custom in those days to precede infantry attacks with cavalry attacks to force the enemy to go into square formations. Decimated by Allied artillery, d'Erlons divisions continued forward. The French infantry captured the sandpit, Papelotte and the enclosures around La-Haie-Sainte but could not break into the main buildings. Bylandt's brigade ran away. One of Ompteda's KGL (Kings German Legion) battalions sent by Wellington to reinforce La-Haie-Sainte was cut to pieces by Traver's cuirassiers. Had enough cavalry been allotted to this attack, Wellington's line of defense could have very well been broken in this initial attack.

At that time Picton's division counterattacked. The French wavered under the British volleys, short-range artillery fire and devastating bayonet charges. In the furious fight that ensued, General Picton was killed. He was still wearing his civilian clothes since his luggage had not arrived in time.

Lord Uxbridge seized this moment and ordered his British cavalry to advance. The cavalry brigades of Somerset and Ponsonby charged down on the French. Somerset's Household Brigade routed Traver's cuirassiers, then plunged into the mass of the French infantry while Ponsonby's Union Brigade charged on Marcognet's columns. Completely surprised, the French panicked and ran after a fierce struggle, losing some 3,000 men, the eagles of the 45th and 105th Regiments and two companies of horse artillery. Overexcited by this success, Ponsonby's brigade continued and charged the Grand Battery in the valley. Although they reached the guns and killed many artillerymen their charge was doomed. Napoleon sent in one of Milhaud's cuirassier brigades and Jacquinot's lancers to counterattack. Ponsonby was killed and his brigade was cut to pieces by this counterattack, some 1,000 officers and troopers of the Union Brigade were killed and the brigade ceased to exist as a unit. Somerset's brigade, which had pursued Traver's cuirassiers for a while, escaped with lighter casualties.

The only French division that steadily advanced was Durutte's division until the defeat of the other French divisions forced him to retreat too. Though attacked by Vandeleur's cavalry he withdrew in good order. D'Erlons shaken corps had taken a beating and would not be reformed and ready to fight again before 1600.

Wellington used the time won by his heavy cavalry to reinforce La-Haie-Sainte, reoccupy the sandpit and bring up a reserve brigade into the line. On the left flank Prince Bernhardt retook Papelotte.

Meanwhile the pointless fighting at Goumont continued. Napoleon ordered to use howitzers against the Chateau. These howitzers soon set the place on fire but it's defenders still held out. At 1530 Napoleon decided that the Allied center must be smashed. He ordered Ney to take La-Haie-Sainte no matter at what cost. Ney again occupied the grounds but can not break through to the buildings. By 1600 the artillery duel reached a climax, the more numerous French guns gained the upper hand and pounded the Allied center. Wellington ordered his line to retreat behind the crest of the plateau. He summoned units from his right and left to rebuild his battered center. Long columns of wounded soldiers started marching toward Brussels. Ney, seeing these movements through the thick curtain of smoke that must have been over the battlefield by then, concluded that Wellington was retreating. He orders Milhaud's cuirassier corps forward. For some unknown reason the Light Cavalry Division of the Guard, under Lefebvre-Desnoëttes, followed. Ney sent this cavalry against the least damaged part of the Allied line, the right center, but without infantry or artillery support.

Again "le rougard" makes another grave tactical error. Without infantry and artillery support a cavalry charge cannot succeed, even worse, by choosing this direction of attack Ney forces the Grand Battery to cease their supporting fire.

Fired upon by the British artillery until the last possible moment, hindered by the soft, wet ground and the passage over the sunken Ohain road, at 1600 about 5,000 sabres charged up the plateau to find the Allied infantry formed in 20 squares. Without enough room and speed, the momentum of the charge was broken. The horsemen swept around the squares, trying to penetrate them. Uxbridge's cavalry counterattacked and sent the French back down the slope. The cuirassier and Guard cavalry rallied and renewed

their charge several times.

Napoleon was furious when he saw Ney's premature action but knowing that the attack must be supported, ordered Kellerman and Guyot to join the charge. At 1700, the whole French cavalry was committed, some 10,000 sabres in all. The British claimed that no squares were broken but it seems that some of them were severely cut up. After perhaps as much as twelve unsuccessful charges the remainder of the French cavalry retired, badly shaken up. The British Colonel Frazer said the following about the charge of the French cavalry: "Never did cavalry behave so nobly, or was received by infantry so firmly."

Except for the two brigades on the left flank, Wellington's cavalry was used up and most of his artillery was in a bad shape. The French had not spiked the guns or destroyed the rammers and sponge-staves when they had them in their possession but many gunners simply disappeared! At that time Ney remembered that he still has Bachelu's division and a brigade from Foy's division and he threw them unsupported against the Allied line. This attack fails under heavy fire and within in ten minutes 1,500 men are killed or wounded. Meanwhile, Lobau managed to keep Bülow from emerging from the bois de Paris with a bold series of attacks, but the Prussians with their superior numbers fought their way to Plancenoit.

At 1730 Napoleon ordered Ney again to take La-Haie-Sainte. The French had worked up close to the buildings by now and two Allied battalions sent to reinforce the farm were caught by cuirassiers. Uxbridge managed to extricate one, but only after it suffered heavy losses. The other battalion was destroyed. Ney, heavily supported by artillery and some cavalry, took personal command of an infantry regiment and a company of engineers and captured La-Haie-Sainte at 1800 in a furious assault. The survivors of the Kings German Legion that had occupied the farm had to run for their lives. Ney then brought up artillery against the crumbling Allied center and called on Napoleon for reinforcements. Napoleon answered something like; "troops, were do you want me to find them, do you want me to make some?" This was perhaps the moment of truth and had Napoleon sent in the Imperial Guard at this time the battle could have been won. Nevertheless Napoleon had good reasons for refusing Ney's request. The Prussians had at last reached Plancenoit and their cannonballs started to reach his reserves on the Brussels-Charleroi road. The Emperor ordered General Dushesme to recapture Plancenoit with the Young Guard. Bülow counterattacked, was repulsed and counterattacked again. Dushesme was mortally wounded and the Young Guard was thrown out of Plancenoit. Napoleon then turned to his faithful Old Guard. Generals Morand and Pelet with two battalions of grenadiers and chasseurs of the Old Guard were send in with the bayonet. Two Guard battalions pitted against fourteen Prussian battalions, but in only 20 minutes the Guard cleaned out Plancenoit, leaving some 3,000 Prussian casualties. Lobau also had successfully counterattacked in the meantime and the Young Guard occupied Plancenoit again.

Meanwhile Ney pressed his attack on Wellington's left and center but he saw his chances of victory diminish with the minute. The presence of some cuirassiers forced the Allied infantry regiments to stay in squares while short range musket fire of French skirmishers and French guns at point blank range severely damaged them. The Allied infantry took a heavy beating. The remainder of the Allied cavalry tried to do what they could but they too were a spent force. Some cavalry regiments refused to charge and some even ran away. In the midst of this inferno Wellington rode along his line, urging his troops to fight back. Reinforcements were coming from the right wing and the Prussians kept coming so all was not lost yet.

With Bülow repulsed Napoleon turned back to his original plan. Wellington's forces were so shattered that one decisive blow could finish them off. The Prussian reinforcements were very slow to arrive and the sound of guns coming from the general direction of Wavre told Napoleon that Grouchy had engaged the Prussians too.

Napoleon still had 9 battalions of his Old and Middle Guard in reserve. At 1900 the Guard was ordered forward. Napoleon himself marched at the head of the Guard with Generals Friant and Drouot before giving command to Ney some 600 yards before the enemy lines. By this time troops were appearing in the northeast. These were of course the Prussians but Napoleon had it circulated that they were Grouchy's troops. The French troops were excited and all shouted: "Vive l'Empéreur, en avant!" But this lasted only for a moment since it soon became apparent that the arriving troops were Prussian. The morale of the French evaporated and they hesitated.

Now all hope was with the Guard as they marched forward on the sounds of the "Pas de charge." But Wellington was ready, his center was reinforced and his troops were awaiting the French from concealed positions like the bank of the Ohain road. Instead of taking the relative short route directly into Wellington's battered center, Ney led the Guard northwest along the same track he had previously led the cavalry. This way the Allied troops at Goumont were able to enfilade them during their advance. After leaving two battalions to face Goumont Ney led the other seven (some sources say four, five, six or eight) battalions in a single column to the enemy. Soon the column split in two. Whether this was deliberate or by accident is not known; however, a column of grenadiers moved directly toward the position of the British Guard, leaving La-Haie-Sainte on their right while the chasseur column moved parallel on the left side of the grenadiers. The French attack near La-Haie-Sainte was halted by musket fire from General Chassé's division. Further west, the grenadiers were suddenly fired upon by Maitland's British Guards, who rose from behind their protective bank of the Ohain road. Surprised by this sudden apparition, the grenadiers stopped. The British poured volley after volley into the ranks of the Imperial Guard. The grenadiers hesitated, then turned and retreated. It was more than even they could withstand.

No more than ten minutes later, the chasseur column was attacked by Adam's light brigade that had concealed itself in high standing corn and suddenly appeared on the chasseur's flank. The chasseurs stopped and turned to face this enemy. Wellington then ordered all troops in the vicinity to charge with the bayonet. The French were unable to form and after a bloody fight they retreated too.

The Imperial Guard's retreat around 2010 staggered the French line. The cry "La Garde recule, sauve qui peut" spread through the French ranks. Zieten's arriving Prussians had driven a wedge between Lobau and Durutte and Bülow renewed his attacks on Plancenoit. Wellington waved his hat, thereby ordering his whole line forward.

Four (some say three) uncommitted Guard battalions formed squares just south of La-Haie-Sainte and the two reserve Guard battalions did the same thing at La- Belle-Alliance. Although these battalions were able to hold off the advancing Allied and Prussian cavalry, they gradually disintegrated under the constant pressure of fugitives seeking refuge in them and the continuing Allied attacks. Legend says that General Cambronne shouted "merde" in the spirit of the Guard dies but never surrenders to the British when they asked him to surrender. The battalions of the Young Guard still at Plancenoit retreated in good order as did the two remaining squares at La Belle Alliance.

Napoleon remained in one of them for some time but then he rode ahead to Genappe. Covered by the remainder of the Guard, fragments of other commands retreated towards Genappe. Wellington and Blücher met at La-Belle-Alliance at about 2100. The pursuit of the French was left to the "fresh" Prussian cavalry while the Allied army remained on the battlefield for the night. Although Gneisenau himself took command of the pursuit, all contact with the routed French was lost by daybreak.

The Battle of Waterloo was over; Napoleon had fought his last battle. Blücher wanted to call it the battle of La-Belle-Alliance but Wellington won the discussion: he called it the battle of Waterloo because that sounded more English and his headquarters was at Waterloo during the battle.

Casualties

Anglo-Dutch casualties were approximately 15,000 killed and wounded and several thousand more missing. About 7,000 Prussians killed or wounded. The French lost about 26,000 killed and wounded 9,000 missing, and 9,000 prisoners.

Conclusion

Why did Napoleon lose this battle? Many mistakes were made, not only by the Emperor himself but also by his subordinates.

The first mistake made was the postponement of the attack until 1300. This gave the Prussians the time to arrive on the battlefield in time. As you read before the effect of the artillery during the initial attack was minimal, anyway so he shouldn't have waited for the ground to dry. Napoleon made a second mistake by giving overall command of the attack to Ney. As commander-in-chief, nobody expected Napoleon to lead the assault himself but leaving such an important attack at the discretion of the unreliable Marshal Ney, after all the errors he made in the previous three days, was at least very unwise and most certainly dangerous. Although Ney really was "the bravest of the bravest", he was incapable of leading this big a battle. He fought like a grenadier, not like a Marshal of France.

As stated above, Ney was among other things responsible for spending the French cavalry in a series of unsupported, pointless attacks and in a way for diminishing the chances for success of the Imperial Guard by leading them in a wrong direction. Another big mistake was allowing Jerôme to escalate the diversionary attack on Goumont into a major struggle that kept large parts of II Corps occupied when they were urgently needed Elsewhere. Jerôme himself should have known better.

Another costly mistake was the adaption of an inappropriate formation by three of the four divisions in d'Erlons initial attack. If they had used a better formation, as Durutte had, there would have been far less casualties and a much greater chance for success.

Grouchy can be criticized for not marching to the sound of the guns or for not using some more initiative like you would expect from a Marshal of France. He was under orders to follow the Prussians and to keep them from joining Wellington. He followed them all right but he didn't keep them from joining the Anglo-Dutch as we all know.

Soult's staff work was far from good and he too is responsible for some of the things that went wrong.

But the responsibility for this disaster was with the Emperor himself. He was probably already very sick by then and there were some undeniable signs of deterioration in his overall ability. He had become arrogant and overconfident in his own abilities. The Napoleon of before 1815 would not have lost this battle. He underestimated his opponents and appointed second rate commanders when better men like Davout and Suchet were available. His greatest mistake was his lack of personal control over the battle. He was at Waterloo, but he wasn't worth 40,000 men anymore.

Tribute must go to Wellington, Blücher, and their soldiers. The Anglo-Dutch army was nothing more then a collection of multilingual units, many of them militia and depot units that never saw action before, yet they have beaten a formidable opponent. Blücher's loyalty and the staying power of his soldiers after Ligny saved Wellington's army since without them the Anglo-Dutch would have been beaten.

In the afternoon of 18 June 1815, while Napoleon Bonaparte was fighting his last battle on the fields of Waterloo, Marshal Grouchy fought Thielmann's Prussian army corps near the village of Wavre. The day after victory was his, but it meant nothing anymore since his master, the Emperor of the French, was defeated at Waterloo.

French casualties were about 2,600 killed and wounded.

The Prussians lost about 2,500 killed and wounded.

Grouchy was under orders to pursue the Prussians. This is exactly what he did, but with little success. He was not ordered to come to Waterloo before 1900 on 18 June when he couldn't come anymore. Therefore, in my opinion, he cannot be called a traitor as many (mostly French) people called him after the campaign of the hundred days.

It is however true that he acted with little initiative or speed, unbecoming of a Marshal of France, and that he failed in executing his orders: preventing the Prussians from joining Wellington. As we all know, it was the arrival of the Prussians on the Waterloo battlefield that sealed Napoleon's fate.

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